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8WAGE SUBSIDIES FOR THE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED:
A SEARCH THEORETIC ANALYSIS
James Richardson
Wage subsidies are not a new policy. The Weimar Republic
implemented a wage subsidy for six months in 1932 (Kopits, 1978).
Irving Fisher sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to persuade Roosevelt to
include them in the New Deal (Allen, 1977).  Theoretical analysis
goes back to Pigou (1933) and Kaldor (1936).  Since then they have
remained a frequently-used but rarely sustained weapon in the
armoury of governments faced with mass unemployment.
The persistence of high and long-term unemployment in many
OECD countries during the 1980s and 1990s has led to a renewed
interest in wage subsidy schemes among policy makers.  In Australia
the Jobstart programme, introduced in 1985, now accounts for 80%
of placements of the long-term and very long-term unemployed
(Byrne and Buchanan, 1994), whilst in the UK it has been estimated
that an expansion of the existing Workstart pilots could reduce
unemployment by 250,000 (NERA, 1996).
However, wage subsidy schemes have always attracted
opposition on the grounds that they have very high levels of
deadweight and substitution: those who are helped by the scheme
either did not need help or were only helped at the expense of
someone else. Casey and Bruche (1985), for example, claim that the
net employment effect is generally only about 10%. But this
scepticism is based on a partial equilibrium analysis. We show that
in a general equilibrium framework there are positive externalities to
substitution. Inducing employers to hire the long-term unemployed
in place of the short-term unemployed reduces wage pressure and
increases the attractiveness of the remaining pool of unemployed to
other employers. Hence more vacancies are opened, many of which
will be filled by the short-term unemployed.
The possibility that churning the pool of unemployed could
reduce equilibrium wage pressure has been recognised at least since
Baily and Tobin (1977). However, the claim that wage subsidies
9targeted on the long-term unemployed will not provoke inflationary
pressures has been subject to little theoretical analysis since then.
Snower (1994), for example, merely invokes it as an axiom. In
contrast, Calmfors and his various collaborators have warned that
active labour market policies could increase wage pressure (e.g.
Calmfors and Forslund, 1990; 1991; Calmfors and Nymoen, 1990;
Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). Calmfors and Lang (1995) provides
a comprehensive, if somewhat tortuous, analysis of Swedish-style
programme-based active labour market policy that formalises this
notion.
However, Calmfors and Lang’s analysis assumes that active
labour market policies take the form of specific programmes into
which the unemployed are placed, such as relief work or training
schemes. Wage subsidies (and job search assistance) act differently.
Their purpose is to increase the probability of transitions directly
from unemployment into regular employment. In an earlier paper
(Richardson, 1997), we analysed the supply-side effects of a wage
subsidy. If increases in the outflow of long-term unemployed
workers are at the expense of the short-term unemployed, wage
pressure falls. Considered from the perspective of wage-setters, any
gains to the long-term unemployed are a more distant prospect than
any losses to the short-term unemployed, and will be discounted
more heavily. Hence, at given levels of wage pressure, gains to the
long-term unemployed can outweigh losses to the short-term
unemployed, allowing unemployment to fall.
In this paper, we extend this analysis to incorporate the
demand side. A search model provides the natural framework to
examine these issues together. We develop a model in which the
subsidy serves to offset the cost of hiring the long-term unemployed.
Subsidies directly reduce the costs of hiring to any firm that hires the
long-term unemployed, and hence increase labour demand. But they
also reduce the costs faced by other firms. Because fewer workers
are rejected, the expected duration of vacancies falls and hence their
expected cost, so that more firms are induced to open vacancies. In
addition, more of the unemployed are ‘higher quality’ short-term
unemployed, further reducing the cost of recruiting.
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The overall effect is that unemployment unambiguously falls.
However, unlike Richardson (1997), it is no longer clear what the
effect will be on short-term unemployment. Here, the substitution
effects that are generally assumed to increase short-term
unemployment bring about positive externalities and the effect on
short-term unemployment is ambiguous. At best, in general
equilibrium there may be no substitution effects. Both short- and
long-term unemployment can fall. At the least, the estimates of
substitution derived from partial equilibrium analysis are overstated.
1. SUBSIDISING THE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED
Suppose the government offers a subsidy to employers hiring long-
term unemployed workers. We assume that there would be some
provisions within the scheme to prevent ‘subsidy-farming’, in
particular that firms which were laying off other workers would be
ineligible. Subsidised workers would also have to be employed
continuously for a period of, say, six months. However, we do not
impose any other restrictions on eligibility. Firms would not be
required to show that vacancies would not otherwise have been
created, nor would there be any restriction on their using the subsidy
to replace workers who quit voluntarily.
It is well-known that the outflow rates from unemployment fall
substantially with unemployment duration in most OECD countries
(Layard et al, 1991). Various reasons have been suggested for this,
including loss of human capital, employer discrimination and worker
demoralisation. The last of these is connected to reduced search
intensity and effectiveness, which we will not treat here, preferring
for simplicity to assume that search intensity is fixed. These issues
will be the subject of future work.
Instead, we assume that long-term unemployment leads to an
attrition of the skills of the long-term unemployed, and hence that
firms must pay a cost for initial training when hiring the long-term
unemployed. Alternatively this cost could be seen as a measure of
employers’ discrimination against the long-term unemployed – their
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disutility of employing the long-term unemployed. If this cost is too
high it will be optimal for a firm to reject the worker and continue
searching either for a short-term unemployed worker, or a lower cost
long-term unemployed worker. However, once training is provided,
the worker becomes fully productive. Provided the worker is
properly re-integrated into regular employment, there are no
permanently damaging effects from long-term unemployment.
We further assume that the initial training cost is stochastic and
match-specific. It is likely that individuals’ various skills will decline
in varying ways that will affect their suitability differently for
different potential jobs. Hence different individuals will need
different patterns and extents of retraining for different jobs.
Stochastic costs ensure that all unemployed workers have a positive
probability of leaving unemployment, but that the probability is
lower for the long-term than the short-term unemployed.
The basic idea is very similar to Pissarides’ (1990) stochastic
job matching model, but whereas Pissarides has a stochastic
productivity that affects the worker for as long as they are in a given
job, we assume that the stochastic element is an initial cost only.
This is similar to the stochastic costs in Diamond’s (1982) ‘coconut’
model and fits with the evidence from wage subsidy schemes that,
beyond the initial period, the productivity of scheme participants
and regular employees are the same (Arwady, 1988; Atkinson and
Meager, 1994). It also ensures that subsidised hires receive the same
wages as regular hires, which is again what we observe even where
schemes do not stipulate that participants must be paid the going
wage (Atkinson and Meager, 1994).
Separations
We assume that the separation rate, s, is fixed and exogenous.
Within our model, this is entirely consistent. Once the initial training
cost is paid, the worker is fully productive and hence the match
always has positive value. Thus there is never any incentive for the
firm to separate with the worker and we can assume that the rate of
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separation of subsidised workers is the same as unsubsidised
workers.
In practise, however, there is always a concern that many
subsidised jobs will only be viable for as long as the subsidy is paid,
and will therefore separate at the end of the subsidy period. There is
little empirical evidence on this question. Atkinson and Meager
(1994) found that only one out of 329 employers had laid off
Workstart recruits when their subsidy expired, but it seems likely
that most of their sample were still in receipt of the subsidy at the
time of the survey. Arwady (1988) in a study of the single largest
user of the US Targeted Jobs Tax Credit found that employee tenure
was longer for subsidised than unsubsidised workers, but the firm
concerned was in a very high turnover industry (private security),
and this result may not generalise.
Moreover, theoretically the effects of the subsidy on turnover
are ambiguous. Inflows may increase if jobs are created that are only
viable with the subsidy, and which consequently break up at the end
of the subsidy period. In addition, if the scheme leads to poorer
quality matches, then inflow may rise. Against this, however, the
scheme is likely to extend the tenure of jobs that would otherwise
have been shorter than the subsidy period, reducing inflows.
This leaves it as essentially an empirical question, on which
unfortunately we have little direct data, as to whether inflows are
more likely to rise or fall as a consequence of the policy. However,
we do have some indirect data that is relevant. A higher break-up
rate, because jobs are not viable without the subsidy, is only relevant
to those jobs that the firm would not have created in the absence of
the subsidy. Jobs that would have been created anyway must clearly
be viable without the subsidy. Hence only a minority, about 10%
(Casey and Bruche, 1985), of subsidised jobs are potentially subject
to this effect. Furthermore, if the worker acquires sufficient firm-
specific human capital during their subsidised employment, then a
job that was initially non-viable without the subsidy may
nonetheless be viable when the subsidy expires. Poorer matching
quality might also increase separations, but there is little evidence
for this. For example, Atkinson and Meager (1994) found only 11%
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of employers reported that their subsidised workers were less
productive than normal recruits by the end of the subsidy period.
12% were more productive.
Conversely, all employers receiving the subsidy, whether they
would have created the vacancy without the subsidy or not, have an
incentive to maintain the job at least for the duration of the subsidy:
normally between six months and one year. In the UK, for example,
40% of unemployed workers who exit into employment re-enter
unemployment within six months, 25% within three months
(Sweeney, 1996). Thus, for a substantial proportion of subsidised
workers, the subsidy may serve to increase tenure, even if they
separate immediately the subsidy is withdrawn.
Overall, the evidence is patchy and inconclusive. But there is
not a compelling case to suppose that inflow rates will rise. The
opposite seems at least as likely. Our assumption of constant inflows
seems as good, or bad, as any other.
2. THE MODEL
Following the standard search framework (e.g. Pissarides, 1990), we
assume that there is an aggregate matching function ( )x x u v= , ,
where x is the total number of contacts between firms and workers
per period and u and v are the rates of unemployment and vacancies
respectively. The labour force is normalised to unity. The matching
function has the normal properties: increasing in both its arguments
and constant returns to scale. We further assume that contacts are
random and that any vacancy is contacted by no more than one
worker per period.
Hence if we let q = v u , we can define the probability that any
given vacancy is contacted by an unemployed worker as:
( ) ( )q x u v vq = , (1)
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where from the properties of the matching function, we have
( )¢ <q q 0 , and h, the absolute value of the elasticity of q with
respect to q, is between 0 and 1.
After separation, workers enter short-term unemployment.
After one period, if they have not found a job, they become long-
term unemployed, and remain so until they exit into employment.
Let uS, uL be the rates of short- and long-term unemployment
respectively. Since matching is random and the firm is contacted by
at most one worker per period, we can define the probabilities that
any given vacancy is contacted by a short- or long-term unemployed
person per period as ( ) ( )uuS q q  and ( ) ( )1 - uuS q q  respectively.
We assume that all workers search equally effectively, and
hence, for the worker, the probability of contacting a vacancy is
independent of their unemployment duration and given by:
( ) ( )q qq x u v u= , (2)
Vacancies
Our basic unit of analysis is the job. Jobs are either vacant or filled
and productive. Vacant jobs incur a per period cost of g, whilst filled
jobs yield output with real value ¢y . Short-term unemployed workers
are ‘job-ready’ – they have not yet suffered from any loss of human
capital. Hence if a vacant job is contacted by a short-term
unemployed worker, it can be filled with no additional cost. Since,
as we show below, there will be a single wage greater than the
benefit level, both the firm’s and the worker’s acceptance decisions
are trivial in this case and such matches will never be rejected.
However, if the vacancy is contacted by a long-term
unemployed worker, the firm must pay an additional initial training
cost, a, if it hires the worker. We assume that wages are set by Nash
bargaining and must be renegotiation proof. Hence the firm cannot
pass on the cost to the worker. The long-term unemployed vary in
how well matched they would be with any particular vacancy, and
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hence what costs would have to be incurred to make them fully
productive. We assume, therefore, that ex ante the training cost a is
unknown and drawn randomly from some underlying, known,
distribution G(a). Ex post, once contact has been made, a is
revealed and the firm can decide whether to accept or reject the
worker with full information.
We assume that G(a) is continuous and at least once
differentiable, and has finite range within the positive quadrant.
Provided the lower support of G(a)£g, the long-term unemployed
will always have a positive outflow rate. Since the firm must pay at
least g if it rejects the worker, it will always accept any worker
whose training cost is less than g. We also suppose that the upper
support of G(a) is sufficiently above g to ensure that rejection is
optimal in some cases. Since the short-term unemployed are never
rejected, this will generate negative duration dependence.
A subsidy y is payable when firms hire the long-term
unemployed, financed by a proportional wage tax. Suppose the firm
adopts a reservation training cost, ar, hires all long-term unemployed
workers with costs below ar, and rejects all those with training cost
above ar. We show below that this is optimal, given that wages must
be renegotiation proof. It follows that firms will hire a long-term
unemployed worker, given that contact has been made, with
probability G(ar).
Let V be the expected present discounted value of a vacant job
and J be the expected present discounted value of a filled job. We
have:
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
rV q J V
q G J V e
u
u
u
u r r
S
S
= - + - +
- - + - £
g q
q a y a a a1
(3)
Where r is the interest rate, e is the expectations operator, and
the expectation term is the ex ante expected training cost of hiring a
long-term unemployed worker, given that this cost is low enough
that they are not rejected.
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There is free entry of vacancies, and hence firms open
vacancies until the marginal value of a vacancy is driven to zero,
giving V=0.
Hiring
Once contact has been made between a vacancy and a worker, both
parties must decide whether to accept or reject the match. We will
show below that all jobs offer the same wage, which is always at
least as great as unemployment benefit. Hence the worker’s decision
is trivial: workers always accept jobs if offered.
The firm’s hiring decision is slightly more complex. The return
to rejecting the worker is simply the value of a vacancy, V, which
equals zero. If the firm is contacted by a short-term unemployed
worker, then the return to hiring them is simply J, the value of a
filled job. Since this is always positive, the decision is again trivial in
this case. Firms always accept short-term unemployed workers.
However, if the firm is contacted by a long-term unemployed
worker, with a realised training cost of ai, then the firm will only
accept them provided the return is greater than zero:
J i- + ³a y 0 (4)
Provided the wage is renegotiation proof, J will be independent
of the training cost, ai. Hence there will exist a unique reservation
training cost, ar, such that:
J r- + =a y 0
so that the firm will reject all workers with realisations of a greater
than ar, and accept all others.
Hence, we can write:
J r= -a y (5)
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Substituting (5) and the free entry condition V=0 into (3) gives
the firm’s vacancy opening condition:
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]g q a y q a a a a a= - + - - £uu r uu r r rS Sq q G e1 (6)
Filled jobs and wages
Filled jobs produce per period real output ¢y  and pay real before tax
wages of w and a proportional wage tax t. There is an exogenous
probability, s, of separation. Hence, the value function for a filled
job is given by:
( )rJ y w t sJ= ¢ - + -1 (7)
Let E be the expected present discounted value to the worker
of being employed and US the expected present discounted value of
short-term unemployment. Since workers who separate always
become short-term unemployed in the first instance, the value
function for the worker of being employed is given by:
( )rE w s U ES= + - (8)
Wages are determined by Nash bargaining. We assume further
that wage contracts are necessarily incomplete and can always be
renegotiated. We focus exclusively on renegotiation-proof contracts,
which in this case implies simply that neither the sunk costs of
training, nor the benefits of subsidies, form part of the wage bargain.
Hence, wages are set to maximise the Nash bargain:
( ) ( )E U J Vi S i- - -b b1 (9)
Where the i subscript denotes the particular match, and b is a
measure of the worker’s relative bargaining power. Maximising (9)
gives, after a little rearrangement, and noting that V=0:
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( )( )
E U
t
Ji
S
i- = - +
b
b1 1
(10)
However if we substitute the value functions for Ei and Ji – the
match-specific forms of equations (7) and (8):
( )rE w s U Ei i S i= + -
(11)
( )rJ y w t sJi i i= ¢ - + -1
(12)
we obtain:
w rU
y
t
rUi
S S= + ¢
+
-æ
èç
ö
ø÷
b
1
From which it follows that there will be a single wage. Hence
we can drop the i subscript.
From (2), the probability that an unemployed worker will
contact a vacancy is given by qq(q). Since the short-term
unemployed are always accepted, this is also their probability of
being hired, whilst for the long-term unemployed the probability of
being hired is given by ( ) ( )G qra q q .
Hence, the value functions for unemployment are given by:
( ) ( )[ ] ( )U q E qr b U
S L= +
-
+
+q q
q q1
1
(13)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )U G q E G qr b U
L
r
r L= +
-
+
+a q q
a q q1
1
(14)
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Where b is the per period real level of benefits. We assume,
both here and in determining flow equilibrium below, that
transitions from unemployment into employment occur at the
beginning of the period. This simplifies the algebra somewhat and
prevents unemployment from being bounded below at the per period
inflow (Manning, 1993). However, our results do not depend on this
assumption. Solving (10) –(14), and substituting from (5), we obtain
the wage equation:
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )w b t r s
q r G
qr
r= +
- +
- + +
+
-
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
b
b
a y
q q a
q q1 1 1
(15)
If we further assume that benefits are set to maintain a constant
replacement ratio r then we have:
( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )w t r s
q r G
qr
r=
- + -
- + +
+
-
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
b
b r
a y
q q a
q q1 1 1 1
(16)
Combining equations (5), (7) and (16) gives the reservation
training cost schedule:
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )( )
¢ -
- -
- + +
+
-
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú -
+ - =
y r s
q r G
q
r s
r
r
r
b
b r
a y
q q a
q q
a y
1 1 1
0
(17)
Finally, we impose a balanced budget requirement:
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( ) ( ) ( )tw u wu G q ur L1- = +r y a q q
(18)
Total taxes must equal benefit payments to the unemployed
plus subsidy payments to the per period flow out of long-term
unemployment.
Flow equilibrium
We consider stationary equilibria in which unemployment is
constant. Hence the flows into and out of unemployment must be
equal. If we define stocks at the end of period to allow for the fact
that some proportion of the inflow into unemployment exit during
the period, then we have:
( )[ ] ( )1 1- - =q qq s u uS
(19)
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )u G q G q uS r r L1 - =a q q a q q
(20)
Since short-term unemployment lasts only for one period, the
existing stock must always have flowed out by the following period.
Hence, the stock of short-term unemployed is simply the inflow into
unemployment, less those who flow out again during the period.
Similarly, the inflow into long-term unemployment is made up
of all those who were short-term unemployed at the end of the last
period, less those who flow back into employment during the period.
Since we assume that the stocks are constant in equilibrium, this net
inflow must equal the outflow from the pre-existing stock of long-
term unemployed.
Solving the flow conditions gives:
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( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]u
s q
G q s qr
=
-
+ -
1
1
q q
a q q q q
(21)
( ) ( )u
u
G qS r= a q q
(22)
where (21) is the Beveridge curve.
Equations (6), (16), (17), (18), (21) and (22) determine the
model which has six unknowns: q, ar, w, t, u and uS/u. If we
substitute (22) into (6), then the system is recursive: Equations (6)
and (17) determine labour market tightness, q, and the reservation
training cost ar. Equation (21) then determines unemployment,
whilst (16) and (18) solve for wages and taxes.
However, we can simplify things somewhat by assuming a
particular form for the distribution of ai. In particular, we shall
assume that a is uniformly distributed on [k, k+1], where, 0£k£g.
Hence:
( )G kr ra a= -
( ) ( )e kr ra a a a£ = +12
Substituting the above gives the determining equations of the
model as:
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]g q a y q a= - + - -uu r uu rS Sq q k12 21       (23)
( )( ) ( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )( )
¢ -
- -
- + +
+ -
-
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú -
+ - =
y r s
q r k
q
r s
r
r
r
b
b r
a y
q q a
q q
a y
1 1 1
0
      (24)
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( )( )u
u
q kS r= -q q a       (25)
( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]u
s q
k q s qr
=
-
- + -
1
1
q q
a q q q q
(26)
( )( )( ) ( )
( )[ ]
( )
w
t
r s
q r k
qr
r=
- + -
- + +
+ -
-
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
b
b r
a y
q q a
q q1 1 1 1
(27)
( ) ( ) ( )tw u wu k q ur L1- = + -r y a q q
(28)
where ( )u uL uuS= -1 .
3. POLICY
The policy variable of interest is y, the level of subsidy offered to
employers who hire the long-term unemployed. To obtain the effect
of y on unemployment, wages and taxes we first need to
differentiate (23)–(25) to obtain the effect on q and ar.
Differentiating (24) is straightforward and yields:
( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )
¢
-
+
-
- - -
ì
í
î
ü
ý
þ
+
- + - -
- - -
ì
í
ï
îï
ü
ý
ï
þï
=
¢
-
y q
q
d
d
r k q
q
d
d
y
r
r r
r r
r
a y
b a y q q
b r q q
a
y
b a y a q h
b r q q
q
y a y
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
2
(29)
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Where all the terms are positive. However, differentiating (23)
and (25) yields:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }
( )( )( ){ } ( )( )
q k q
d
d
q
d
d
q
u
u
u
u r
r
u
u
u
u
S S
S S
q a zq q
a
y
q
hg z q h
q
y
q
+ - - + +
- + - =
1
1
1
  
(30)
where: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]z a y a a y a a a= - - - = - + - £r r r rk J G J e12 2
the difference between the ex ante expected value of contacting a
short-term unemployed worker versus contacting a long-term
unemployed worker. We shall assume that subsidies are not so large
that z becomes negative. The first and last terms of (30) are always
positive, but the middle term is ambiguous: if h is sufficiently small it
could be positive.
The term represents the (partial) marginal effect of an increase
in labour market tightness on the value of a vacancy. There are two
offsetting components: an increase in q makes it less likely that you
will contact a worker in any period, tending to increase the cost of
vacancies. However, there is also a compositional effect, an increase
in q means that more of the unemployed are short-term unemployed.
If the short-term unemployed are less costly than the long-term
unemployed, i.e. if z>0, then the change in composition tends to
reduce the cost of vacancies. If this effect dominates, then as the
labour market tightens the firm will open more vacancies, further
tightening the market. This is similar to the thin market externality in
Pissarides (1992). However, it is somewhat perverse in this case, and
provided h is not too small we can rule it out. In general, we will
assume therefore that this term is negative ii.
This allows us to solve (29) and (30) to give:
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( )( )( ){ }
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )[ ]
l
a
y
hg z q h
a y
b a y q q a q h
b r q q
d
d
y q
q r k q
q
r
u
u
r
r r
u
u
S
S
=
¢ - -
-
+
- + - -
- - -
1
1
1 1 1
2
(31)
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )[ ]
l
q
y
q q a zq q
a y
bq q q q a y
b r q q
d
d
y q k q
q q
q
u
u r
r
r
u
u
S
S
=
¢ - - +
-
-
-
- - -
1
1 1 1
(32)
where:
( )( )( ){ }
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ]( )( )
l
hg z q h
a y
bq q a y q h
b r q q
a a zq q
hg q q
q h
=
¢ - -
-
+
- -
- - -
+ - + - - + + +
-
-
ì
í
î
ü
ý
þ
>
y q q q
q
r k k q r
q
q
u
u
r
r
r
u
u
u
u r
u
u
S
S S S
1 1
1 1 1
1
1
1
0
2 x
Hence, 0 1£ £
d
d
ra
y . The subsidy serves to offset the training
cost the firm must incur if it hires the long-term unemployed. Hence
it is able to relax its hiring criterion, hiring long-term unemployed
workers who previously would have been too expensive. However,
as firms relax ar, the outflow rate of the long-term unemployed rises
which puts upward pressure on wages. This chokes off the increase
in ar, so that the increase is less than the full amount of the subsidy.
We can show this directly by substituting (5) into (7) and
differentiating to give:
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~ where: 
(33)
ar rises by the amount of the subsidy, less the increase in the wage
costs discounted over the expected duration of the job.
The effect on q is ambiguous. As we shall see below, u falls,
which tends to make q increase. However, the effect on vacancies is
more complex. The increase in labour demand leads to more
vacancies being opened, and hence tends to make q rise. However,
the long-term unemployed are now less likely to be rejected, and
hence vacancies durations fall, tending to reduce q. Note, however,
that whilst a fall in q will cause the outflow rate of the short-term
unemployed to fall, it need not prevent the outflow rate of the long-
term unemployed from rising, provided the increase in ar is
sufficient.
Unemployment
Our primary interest is in the effect on unemployment.
Differentiating (26) and substituting from (31) and (32) yields:
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(34)
Which is negative. Hence unemployment unambiguously falls.
There are two principal effects: the first term is the labour demand
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effect, the second a net wage pressure effect. The labour demand
effect has three components:
i. The direct effect of the subsidy is to lower the cost of recruiting
the long-term unemployed and hence to make recruiting more
attractive;
ii. Because it increases the probability that contact with a worker
will lead to hiring, the subsidy also reduces the expected
duration of any given vacancy, and hence lowers the cost of
vacancies;
iii. Finally, there is a composition effect. Increased outflow rates
among the long-term unemployed mean that more of the
unemployed are short-term unemployed, who are more
desirable, provided z>0.
The net wage pressure effect arises because an increase in the
outflow rate of the long-term unemployed is discounted more
heavily by wage setters than a fall in the outflow rate of the short-
term unemployed. Hence, at constant disutility of unemployment the
long-term outflow rate can be increased by more than the short-term
outflow rate falls. Thus, even if there were no labour demand effect,
it would be possible to reduce unemployment by inducing
employers to substitute hiring the long-term unemployed instead of
the short-term unemployed, as in Richardson (1997). Note that this
term would be zero if r=0.
Substitution
Much of the discussion of wage subsidy programmes has focused on
substitution effects (OECD, 1993) although some economists,
notably Layard (1996), have sought to play them down. Substitution
is where the firm fills a vacancy with a long-term unemployed (or
other target group) worker in response to the subsidy, but where
they would otherwise have filled the vacancy anyway, but with a
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short-term unemployed or other non-target group worker.
Substitution effects are generally measured through surveys of
employers participating in wage subsidy schemes (e.g. Atkinson and
Meager, 1994; Byrne and Buchanan, 1994) and are usually found to
be quite high, about 60–70% of the non-deadweight effect (OECD,
1993).
However, much of the concern about substitution effects is
misplaced. Substitution does not simply involve churning the
unemployed pool with no net gain. Instead there are positive
externalities to inducing employers to hire the long-term
unemployed in place of the short-term unemployed. Wage pressure
is reduced, allowing lower equilibrium unemployment, and a larger
pool of highly employable short-term unemployed are available to
other firms. This reduces the costs of opening vacancies, so that
more jobs are created. Employers observe these as improvements in
the general economic climate, rather than the specific effects of the
wage subsidy scheme. Nor are they specific to those employers who
participate in the scheme. But many of these additional jobs will go
to the short-term unemployed.
We can formalise this by considering the effect of policy on the
short-term unemployed. From (19), we have:
( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]du
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q s u d
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which is ambiguous. The first term is the effect of changes in labour
market tightness, and will tend to make short-term unemployment
fall if the labour demand effects are sufficiently high, i.e. if 
d
d
q
y > 0.
The second effect arises because, with fixed inflow rate s, a
reduction in unemployment, (i.e. an increase in employment),
increases the inflow in to short-term unemployment.
There are no restrictions within our model on firms’ ability to
use wage subsidies for vacancies that they would have filled anyway.
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Nonetheless, at the aggregate level, there need be no substitution
effect: both short- and long-term unemployment can fall.
Wages and taxes
We have seen in equation (33) that the total wage bill w(1+t) rises
with increased labour demand. However, the separate effects on
wages and taxes are more complex. If the costs of the subsidy –
which includes deadweight payments to employers who would
anyway have hired the long-term unemployed – exceed the savings
from reduced benefits payments then taxes will have to rise.
Potentially this could lead to a fall in take-home pay for employees,
so that the policy would be redistributive rather than improving the
lot of both the employed and the unemployed.
Formally, we can solve for wage and tax effects by
differentiating the balanced budget constraint (28) and substituting
from (33) to obtain:
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which is ambiguous. There are four effects. Wages tend to rise
because of increased labour demand. Lower benefit payments and
higher tax revenues from reduced unemployment tend to reduce the
tax burden and hence increase wages. The third term is the effect of
changes in the outflow from long-term unemployment on the
amount of subsidy that is paid. A higher subsidy increases the
outflow rate, increasing subsidy payments. At the same time,
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however, a reduction in the number of long-term unemployed lowers
the total deadweight. Furthermore, if short-term unemployment is
also falling, then the number of people entering long-term
unemployment, and hence eligible for the subsidy, will also fall.
Hence this effect is ambiguous. Finally, a higher level of subsidy
needs to be financed, tending to increase taxes, lowering wages.
The parallel effect on taxation is given directly from (33) as:
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which is, unsurprisingly, also ambiguous.
4. CONCLUSION
The persistence of mass unemployment in many OECD countries
throughout the 1980s and 1990s has led to a renewed interest in the
use of wage subsidies, and in particular in targeted policies aimed at
the long-term unemployed. Search theory provides a framework in
which the full general equilibrium effects of wage subsidies can be
considered. This allows us to consider both the labour demand
effects that dominated the traditional literature, starting with Pigou
(1933) and Kaldor (1936), and the wage pressure, or supply side,
effects that are particularly prominent in the work of Calmfors and
his collaborators (see especially Calmfors and Lang, 1995).
We are able to show that a policy of targeted wage subsidies
for the long-term unemployed unambiguously reduces
unemployment. Moreover, we show that the analysis of substitution
effects that has dominated much of the debate about wage subsidies
is flawed. There are positive externalities to persuading employers to
favour the long-term unemployed, and those externalities lead to an
increase in the total number of jobs. Many of these new jobs will go
to the very short-term unemployed people who are apparently the
victims of substitution.
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Wage subsidies have been tried before in many countries at
various times. If they alone could slay the giant of unemployment,
we would surely know by now. In many cases they have proved
relatively ineffective because they have been introduced at times of
high cyclical unemployment when firms may well have been
hoarding labour anyway, and when active labour market policies in
general appear to be at their least effective (Robinson, 1995). But in
other cases they have undoubtedly been undermined by an excessive
concern among policy-makers with substitution effects, arising from
partial equilibrium analysis. We have shown that these concerns are
at least overstated, and possibly wholly misplaced. With
unemployment remaining stubbornly high, it is time to look again at
wage subsidies.
31
ENDNOTES
1. In general our results will go through for any distribution for
which ( )[ ]dd er ra a a a£ £ 1 holds.
2. This condition is sufficient to ensure that l is non-negative.
However, provided b is not very small, this condition is
unlikely to bind.
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